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REPORT OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL PURSUANT TO SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 838 (1993)

I. INTRODUCTION

1. In operative paragraph 1 of its resolution 838 (1993) of 10 June 1993, the Security Council requested the Secretary-General to submit as soon as possible a further report on options for the deployment of international observers on the borders of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, giving priority to the border between the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro), in order to monitor effectively the implementation of relevant Security Council resolutions. According to the same paragraph, the international monitors are to be drawn from the United Nations and, if appropriate, from Member States acting nationally or through regional organizations and arrangements. The present report is submitted in order to describe such options, taking into account developments since the Secretary-General's report (S/25000) of 21 December 1992.

II. TASKS ARISING FROM THE RELEVANT RESOLUTIONS

2. The tasks as they relate to the relevant Security Council resolutions 713 (1991), 752 (1992), 757 (1992) and 787 (1992) have been summarized in paragraph 2 of my report (S/25000) of 21 December 1992. Since then, the Council has adopted resolution 819 (1993) which demands that the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) immediately cease the supply of military arms, equipment and services to Bosnian Serb paramilitary units in the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Further, the Council adopted resolution 820 (1993), which imposes a number of additional sanctions on the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) and tightens the implementation of existing ones. In particular, in operative paragraph 12 of resolution 820 (1993), the Security Council decided that import to, export from and transshipment through the UNPAs in Croatia and those areas in Bosnia and Herzegovina under control of Bosnian Serb forces with the exception of humanitarian aid shall be permitted only with proper authorization from the Governments of the Republic of Croatia or the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina respectively. In essence, these resolutions would require the border monitors to concern themselves with all movements of regular and irregular military personnel, weapons and other military equipment and supplies as well as goods subject to sanctions from neighbouring countries destined for Bosnia and Herzegovina or the Serb-occupied areas of Croatia.

3. A major consideration concerning the implementation of the present resolution is the fact that the authorities in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) had earlier expressed their preparedness to stop all but humanitarian supplies to the Bosnian Serb party. In its resolution, the Council takes note of this preparedness and urges the full implementation of that commitment. However, the highest authorities of the Governments of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) and of Serbia have made it clear that they will not submit its implementation to international monitoring.

4. It will be recalled that in paragraph 9 of my report (S/25000) I pointed out that the mere observing and reporting of traffic across the borders of Bosnia and Herzegovina would do little to ensure respect for the relevant resolutions of the Security Council. This could be achieved only by the deployment of United Nations personnel in sufficient numbers and with sufficient equipment to search vehicles and, if necessary, deny passage to forbidden goods. This would require full cooperation by the States concerned. As long as such cooperation is not forthcoming, resolution 838 (1993) cannot be implemented.

III. OPTIONS AND RESOURCE REQUIREMENTS FOR DEPLOYING A BORDER MONITORING FORCE

5. The United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) has studied the possibilities of monitoring the borders of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina in depth and developed two alternative options. Both these options are based on the following assumptions:

(a) The border monitoring arrangements will require full cooperation from all parties concerned;

(b) Border monitoring ideally will have to include all international borders of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, with priority given to those with the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro). Since the latter border is being controlled by governmental agencies of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro), the monitoring mandate should preferably be implemented from that side only. The same would apply to the border with Croatia;

(c) Given the nature of the terrain and the length of the borders it is impracticable to control the borders completely. In principle, only the major crossing points can be effectively monitored;

(d) Where applicable, UNPROFOR would focus its monitoring activity on the work of the national border control agencies.

6. The options and their respective requirements in terms of human and other resources are set out below. Each requirements table presents separately the requirements for monitoring the borders between Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) [48 major crossing points] and between Bosnia and Herzegovina and Croatia [75 crossing points in addition to those where the international borders of Croatia coincide with those

of the United Nations Protected Areas]. This amounts to a total of 123 crossing points along 1,100 km of borderline.

7. The following table outlines the different options and indicates the extent of monitoring or control, respectively, which would be established at each crossing point by deploying observers and/or troops.

	MONITORING ACTIVITY				RESOURCES	
OPTIONS	OBSERVE	REPORT	SEARCH	DENY ACCESS	OBSERVER/TROOPS	INTERPRETERS
1. Border monitoring	X	X			8 each crossing	4 each
2. Border control	X	X	X	X	Platoon at each crossing	As required

The resource requirements of each individual option are set out below:

Option 1.

BORDER MONITORING											
FRY/B&H (48 OP)						FRY + CRO/B&H (123 OP)					
Observers	Interpreters	Other civilian personnel	Total	Radios	Vehicles	Observers	Interpreters	Other civilian personnel	Total	Radios	Vehicles
410	240	132	782	350	169	1 034	615	284	1 933	830	399

8. It should be noted that in this option the observer teams would not be in a position to check the nature of the goods carried in and out of Bosnia and Herzegovina. If such checks were to be carried out by the observers themselves, a much larger number of personnel with training in customs operations would be required. The effectiveness of this option would, therefore, largely depend on the bona fide cooperation of Croatian and Federal Yugoslav customs officers. In fact, the national agencies would continue to execute their border control functions but would be monitored by UNPROFOR observers. (In the UNPAs, however, the local Serb authorities have refused to permit either UNPROFOR or Croatian officials to exercise border control and customs functions.)

9. Regarding the possible use of personnel from the European Community Monitoring Mission (ECMM) or other regional organizations and arrangements, it is the view of the UNPROFOR Force Commander that it would not be effective to establish mixed teams of UNPROFOR and ECMM members. It would, however, be possible to divide the work, with teams from the ECMM or other organizations monitoring specific crossing points assigned to them. UNPROFOR's headquarters, however, would have to be clearly in command of the arrangement and act as the sole reporting agency to the Security Council.

10. To reduce the requirements in terms of military staff, consideration might be given to filling the monitoring positions with CIVPOL monitors, former customs officials, retired border police officials etc. This would reduce the training time required and could also facilitate closer professional cooperation with their respective counterparts in the border control agencies of Croatia and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro). Identifying such officials would, however, require the active cooperation of Governments of Member States. If ex-customs officers and/or border police officials are used, they would be integrated into UNPROFOR's existing civil affairs and Civilian Police structures. This would require additional staff at UNPROFOR Headquarters to provide executive direction and to manage and administer the civilian border monitoring staff.

11. In addition to the above, the deployment of UNPROFOR border monitor teams would necessitate the construction of accommodation at most of the crossing points.

Option 2.

12. This option addresses the possibility that cooperation by the neighbouring countries may be limited or that the Council may wish to establish a higher degree of effective control of the borders of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Full border control would require a capability not only to observe and to report, but also to search, to deny passage and to interdict in cases where the borders have been already crossed. UNPROFOR would in effect supersede the national authorities in respect of certain national border control functions.

13. To fulfil such a mission, UNPROFOR estimates that it would need an infantry platoon at each crossing point. This also reflects the need for a minimum degree of protection for staff deployed at the borders. The total force requirements are presented in the following table:

BORDER CONTROL					
FRY/B&H (48 OPs)			FRY + CRO/B&H (123 OPs)		
48 crossings x 1Pl x 40 each (incl DJPC)		1 920	75 crossings x Inf Pl x 40 each		3 000
4 Pl each Coy 12 Coy's x 20 each HQ Coy	12 Coy's	240	4 Pl each Coy 19 Coy's x 20 each HQ Coy	19 Coy's	380
4 Coys each Batt 3 Batt's x 90 each HQ Coy	3 Batt's	270	4 Coy's each Batt 5 x 90 each HQ Coy	5 Batt's	450
Estimated Log spt Batt-level	200		Estimated Log spt Batt-level	200	
200 strong x 3		600	200 strong x 5		1 000
Signal Platoon x 3		180	Signal Platoon x 5		300
Engs Coy		200	Engs Coy x 2		400
			1 Medical Unit		250
			1 Brigade size HQ/HQ Coy		250
TOTAL		3 410			6 030

14. With a total of eight battalions deployed at the crossing points, additional third line logistics support would be required. This would entail expanding the current logistical bases in Zagreb and Split. Accordingly, UNPROFOR's logistical arrangements would have to be augmented by a Logistics Battalion of 1,000-1,200 all ranks.

15. In addition, a number of CIVPOL Monitors, interpreters and civilian affairs as well as administrative personnel would be needed. Moreover, there would be a need to construct significant additional accommodation and to expand the command and control structure of UNPROFOR.

16. The total additional human resources requirements would, therefore, range from 10,300-10,500 troops and civilian personnel. This would, however, be the essential requirement if UNPROFOR were asked to deny passage to arms and other proscribed material.

IV. OBSERVATIONS

17. In evaluating these options the Security Council may wish to bear in mind that world-wide resources for additional peace-keeping troops are increasingly stretched. In the case of the former Yugoslavia, the Force has been gradually increased to some 24,500 troops, military observers and civil police officers. The recent mandate for the establishment of safe areas will require the addition of a further 7,600 troops. Against this background, and taking into account the proposals made to me by the Force Commander of UNPROFOR, I have to advise the Security Council that it would be unrealistic for the Council to authorize option 2 as the means of implementing Security Council resolution 838 (1993).

18. Even for option 1, substantial additional resources in terms of observers and equipment would be required. Before deciding to try to implement this option, the Security Council might wish to establish whether Member States individually, or through their respective regional organizations or arrangements, would in reality be ready to make available the qualified staff required. It might also wish to take into account the current financial situation of the Organization as described in my report of 24 June 1993 (A/C.5/47/13/Add.1), which shows that outstanding contributions to the peace-keeping accounts in mid-June totalled US$ 1,260 million, that total unpaid assessments at that date totalled US$ 2,235.7 million and that "it is highly probable that in the coming months the Organization will not be able to meet its day-to-day obligations". The members of the Security Council may also wish to bear in mind that even if the necessary personnel and finance were available, the effectiveness of option 1 would depend entirely on the cooperation of the neighbouring countries and the parties concerned in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

19. Preliminary estimates of the costs of option 1 will be circulated shortly as an addendum. The preliminary estimates for option 2 would in essence be identical to those already presented in document S/25000/Add.1.